The Scottish Enlightenment, the Democratic Intellect
and the Work of Madame Justice Wilson by Watson, Alan
Dalhousie Law Journal 
Volume 15 Issue 1 Article 3 
7-1-1992 
The Scottish Enlightenment, the Democratic Intellect and the 
Work of Madame Justice Wilson 
Alan Watson 
University of Georgia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj 
 Part of the Legal History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alan Watson, "The Scottish Enlightenment, the Democratic Intellect and the Work of Madame Justice 
Wilson" (1992) 15:1 Dal LJ 23. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more 
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca. 
Alan Watson The Scottish Enlightenment,
the Democratic Intellect and
the Work of Madame Justice
Wilson*
To talk of Madame Justice Wilson in the context of her Scottish
background, the Scottish Enlightenment and the Democratic Intellect
is one of the most exciting yet daunting tasks I have undertaken. A
huge problem, which I will mention first but not discuss, has been to
get to grips with her towering intellect. As will become clear, this
problem was much diminished by Madame Justice Wilson herself:
she writes with a simplicity, grace, rationality and humanity that may
even lead one to underestimate the complexity of her thought.
I was also less daunted when I realized just how assured is Mad-
ame Justice Wilson's position in history. It does not matter what I say.
I would be astonished if, on the very day on which she announced her
retirement from the bench, some Canadian scholar had not decided to
write a history of her judgments. To me, she is the Canadian Lord
Mansfield. She, like Mansfield, is Scottish, with a legal training and
judicial career outside Scotland, but whose Scottishness is appreciated
as affecting their approach to law. Both are great judges, but Madame
Wilson is Lord Mansfield with a heart.' It was a real treat to read her
judgments. With each one I felt my heart and mind expand.
But there remained the problem of cause and effect of which no
reader of David Hume can be unaware. How can one estimate the
impact of a cultural tradition on an individual? As my master, David
Daube, once put it: 'There is no scholarly effort independent of
fashion - by which I understand a cultural trend - and idiosyncrasy
- by which I understand a personal bent.... Of course, fashion and
idiosyncrasy overlap: the former may owe much to the energy of the
individual, the latter is usually colored by prevalent conditions."' 2 If
one considered a largish number of individuals from a particular
* Dr. Alan Watson, Ernest P. Rogers Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
1. The task was also made easier by the fact that there exists a list of her judgments, both on the
Court of Appeal of Ontario and on the Supreme Court of Canada, which reveals whether she
agreed with all of her colleagues, dissented, dissented in part, gave separate reasons and so on.
There is also, among othervaluable biographical information, a splendid character and background
sketch by Sandra Gwyn, 'Sense & Sensibility,' Saturday Night ( July, 1985), pp. 13ff.
2. D. Daube, "Fashions and Idiosyncrasies in the Exposition of the Roman Law of Property," in
A. Parel and T. Flanagan, eds., Theories of Property, (Waterloo, Ontario, 1979), pp. 35ff.
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cultural milieu against a backdrop of a number of individuals from
other milieus, one might, from general characteristics of the first
group that differed from the characteristics of those others, draw some
conclusions about the impact of the cultural tradition on the group, but
still not know how it affected the individual. I was forced to think of
my own case, as the child of a railway clerk, an M.A. Ordinary
graduate of the University of Glasgow, who had taken the traditional
class of Moral Philosophy. What impact did that background have on
me? Certainly, when I taught at Oxford I felt I was very different from
my colleagues. And I was left in no doubt that my colleagues believed
I was different from them. But was I, and if so, why was IV
To make things more difficult in this case, I could not set Madame
Justice Wilson against the backdrop of her Supreme Court colleagues
and declare her characteristics to be the result of the Scottish cultural
tradition. That tradition has had an important impact on the Canadian
outlook in general. 4 1 am conscious of this whenever I come from the
U.S. to Canada, whether to Toronto or Halifax.5 Moreover, Madame
Justice Wilson is female, her colleagues at first were all male. Is her
obvious empathy with the parties to a law suit the result of the Scottish
Enlightenment, her gender or her own personality? Is her even more
obvious sympathy for the underdog the result of the Democratic
Intellect, her gender or her personality?
Again, although lawyers were prominent in the Enlightenment, in
the Scotland that Madame Justice Wilson left the structure of the
Faculty of Advocates did not much partake of the spirit of the demo-
cratic intellect. For admission there was an upfront fee of £500 - an
enormous sum in these times - and the applicant could not have been
gainfully employed in the previous year. Advocates could not form
partnerships, and they had to be instructed by a solicitor, not directly
by the client. Without connections there would be no work, and no
scope for the "lad or lass o' pains" to show talent.6 A look at the
3. Yet I could have drawn some conclusions about the different world view of my Oxford
students and of my fellow Glaswegians.
4. See, e.g., J. G. RJ.°, 'Beyond the Democratic Intellect: the Scottish Example and University
Reform in Canada's Maritime Provinces, 1870-1933' in P. Axelrod and J.G. Reid, Youth
University and Canadian Society Essays in the Social History of High Education (1989).
5. I almost emigrated to Canada on the completion of my legal studies at Glasgow and, indeed,
made inquiries from the Bar Associations of most of the Provinces. I have little doubt that I
would have been very happy.
6. To engage in sad speculation: I am as morally certain as one can be about such matters that
if Madame Justice Wilson had remained in Scotland she would not have become a Senator of the
College of Justice.
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family relationships of Judges of the Court of Session this century is
instructive. The situation was not much different in the eighteenth
century.7
Nor could I find a mirror image for her empathy and sympathy in
other 'outsider' judges, such as Thurgood Marshall and Sandra Day
O'Connor, respectively the only black and only woman on the U.S.
Supreme Court, or James McKay, the only British Lord Chancellor
not a member of the English Bar.
The approach that was open was to analyze Madame Justice
Wilson's judgments, then attempt to relate these to the characteristics
of the Scottish Enlightenment. Her judgments and dissents are so
numerous that, to avoid the appearance of arbitrary selection, I chose
for no specific reason to concentrate on one year, 1987. But I then
realized that her characteristics are so marked that I need single out
only one case. I picked the rather unlikely seeming one of Kosmopoulos
v. Constitution Insurance Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2, simply because it
came first. I was, however, not surprised to discover subsequently
that it was regarded as a leading case.9 But then, so are many others
recording Madame Justice Wilson's opinion.
Madame Justice Wilson's exposition of the facts is quite remark-
able. In the law reports it occupies less than a page (pp. 6ff).
On February 7, 1972, the respondent, Andreas Kosmopoulos, entered
into a commercial lease for premises located in the City of Toronto.
From these premises he operated a business of manufacturing and
selling leather goods under the name of Spring Leather Goods. This
business was carried on as a sole proprietorship.
On the advice of his solicitor Mr. Kosmopoulos incorporated
Kosmopoulos Leather Goods Limited ("the company") in order to
protect his personal assets. Mr. Kosmopoulos was the sole shareholder
and director of the company. Even though the business was thereafter
technically carried on through the limited company, Mr. Kosmopoulos
always thought that he owned the store and its assets. Virtually all the
documentation required in the business, including bank accounts, sales
tax permits and hydro and telephone accounts, made no reference to the
company but rather to "Andreas Kosmopoulos carrying on business as
7. See, e.g., A.C. Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: a Social History (London, 1976), p. 75f.
8. Elsewhere I have argued that judges as a group reason in accordance with cultural norms that
they have set for themselves: see A. Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law (Georgia,
1991), pp. 221ff.
9. See, e.g., the remarks of the Right Honorable Antonio Lamer, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada,
in "Retirement Ceremony of the Honourable Bertha Wilson, Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa,
Ontario, December 4, 199(Y, p. 3.
26 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Spring Leather Goods" (or some similar phrase). Although Mr.
Kosmopoulos' solicitor tried to obtain the approval of the landlord to
an assignment of the lease of the premises from Mr. Kosmopoulos to
the company, this approval was never obtained. The lessee at all
material times was Mr. Kosmopoulos and not the company.
Soon after Mr. Kosmopoulos started conducting his business in the
leased premises, he contacted the respondent, Aristides Roussakis, in
order to obtain insurance for the contents of the business premises. The
respondents, Aristides Roussakis and Art Roussakis Insurance Agency
Limited ("the insurance agency"), obtained a fire insurance policy with
the General Accident Group for coverage from March 14, 1972 to
March 14, 1975. Even though the insurance agency was well aware of
the fact that the business was being carried on by an incorporated
company, the insured was described on the policy as "Andreas
Kosmopoulos O/A Spring Leather Goods." This policy was renewed
but expired before the date of the loss and was replaced with subscrip-
tion policies issued by Simcoe-Bay Group and Commercial Insurance
Company. The appellant insurance companies are subscribing compa-
nies to the two replacement policies. Both of the replacement policies
showed the insured as "Andreas Kosmopoulos O/A Spring Leather
Goods."
On May 24, 1977 a fire broke out in the adjoining premises and caused
fire, water and smoke damage to the assets of the company and to the
rented premises. Mr. Kosmopoulos filed proofs of loss under the
replacement policies on December 6, 1977 but the appellant companies
refused payment and the present action was commenced.
Nothing is inserted that is not relevant. But it is not a bare recital
of facts. We can taste the atmosphere. The respondent Andreas
Kosmopoulos had a Greek name. So had his insurance broker, Aristides
Roussakis who yet was North Americanized enough to term his agency
Art Roussakis Insurance Agency Limited. Kosmopoulos incorporated
his business in Toronto to protect his personal assets, but, we are told,
he always thought he owned the store and its assets. The feeling
comes across that Madame Justice Wilson knows Mr. Kosmopoulos,
the kind of business that he runs, his way of doing business, his hopes
and ambitions. Not only her head, but her heart is involved. 10
Equally masterful is her description of the judgments of the courts
below (pp. 8ff). But I wish to concentrate on her judgment.
She follows counsel for the appellant insurance companies and
divides the issue into three parts.
10. Likewise in R. v. Robertson, [19871 1 S.C.R. 918 we know the respondent and herflatmate,
Eileen.
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The first question was whether to "lift the corporate veil."
Kosmopoulos was the sole shareholder of his incorporated company,
Kosmopoulos Leather Goods Limited. She states the general rule that
a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders, and notes
that courts may disregard the rule and "lift the corporate veil," but that
the occasions when they do so show no consistent principle. She has
"no doubt that theoretically the veil could be lifted in this case to do
justice" but thinks it unwise to do so, and gives two reasons.
The first is that a person who chooses the benefits of incorporation
should not escape its burdens, so the veil should be lifted only to
protect third parties. The second is that to raise the veil in this case
would create an arbitrary and indefensible distinction between this
situation and that where the corporation had more than one share-
holder but one of them had an overwhelming interest. (pp. 10ff)
The reasons are cogent, rational, and humane, but Madame Justice
Wilson gives me the distinct impression that she would have lifted the
veil if she could not have found for Mr. Kosmopoulos in any other
way. She states: "In addition, it is my view that if the application of
a rule leads to harsh justice, the proper course to follow is to examine
the rule itself rather than affirm it and attempt to ameliorate its ill
effects on a case-by-case basis."
Here we have an extraordinary statement of judicial philosophy.
The usual judicial course is to accept precedent as forming a rule, then
when the rule is seen at times to work injustice to do one of two things.
Judges may follow the rule even when they accept that it works
injustice. 1
Alternatively, they may create exceptions upon exceptions until
the exceptions swallow up the rule. But no consistent principle can be
found in the exceptions. The rule still appears to be the rule.12 Indeed,
legislators often act in the same way: leaving the original, unsatisfac-
tory rule but creating exceptions. 13 What legal rule is there when one
can say, as Madame Justice Wilson says in this case: "As a general
rule a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders:
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) The law on when
a court may disregard this principle by 'lifting the corporate veil' and
regarding the company as a mere 'agent' or 'puppet' of its controlling
11. For a fascinating example see the House of Lords case, President of India v. La Pintada
Compahia, Navigacidn SA., [1985] A.C. 104: cf. Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law,
pp. 222ff.
12. For examples, see, e.g., Watson, Supra, note 8, pp. 143ff.
13. The history of 'Benefit of Clergy' is instructive: see, e.g., A. Watson, Society and Legal
Change (Edinburgh, 1977), pp. 92ff.
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shareholder or parent corporation follows no consistent principle. The
best that can be said is that the 'separate entities' principle is not
enforced when it would yield a result 'too flagrantly opposed to
justice, convenience or the interests of the Revenue': L.C.B. Gower,
Modern Company Law (4th ed. 1979), at p. 112." What law is there
when one can say, or when one has to say, "The rule is followed
except when it is flagrantly unjust or inconvenient?" Yet that is the
line usually taken by judges, though it necessarily leads to arbitrary,
unjustifiable distinctions.
But Madame Justice Wilson would take the radical route: when a
rule works injustices, do not create further exceptions, examine whether
the rule should be changed. Still, in proper judicial fashion, since no
exception need be created, she does not reformulate the law in legisla-
tive fashion. But she indicates she would do so, and opens the way for
others to follow.
The second issue, whether Kosmopoulos was bailee of the compa-
ny's assets, was handled in a crisp, properly legal way. (pp. 12f).
Kosmopoulos controlled the property of the company as its servant, so
the company continued to possess - except in exceptional circum-
stances a servant does not possess the master's property - hence no
bailment. On the basis of that and on the first issue, Kosmopoulos had
no enforceable right to the destroyed and damaged property at com-
mon law or equity.
The third issue was whether the Macaura principle "is presently
the law in Ontario and should continue to be the law of Ontario." We
are put on notice. If Madame Justice Wilson found Macaura to be the
law of Ontario she might still find it ought not to continue to be the
law of Ontario. (pp. 13ff)
The Macaura principle can be briefly stated: the only interests that
are insurable are those that can give rise to legal actions. If this
doctrine applied in Ontario, then Kosmopoulos, being a different legal
entity from Kosmopoulos Leather Goods Limited (whose property
had been destroyed) and having no possession as bailee, had no
insurable interest in the destroyed property.
Madame Justice Wilson attacks the Macaura principle in an illu-
minating way. She follows the advice of Lord Kames (1696-1782).
She analyses the background. More than a century before Macaura
the House of Lords considered the nature of insurable interest in
Lucena v. Crauford (1806), 2 Bos. & Pul. (N.R.) 269, 127 ER 630.
She observes that the much cited judges' opinions from the case on
insurable interest were not critical to the decision. She downgrades
the opinions.
The Scottish Enlightenment and the Work of Mme Justice Wilson 29
But the judges disagreed in Lucena. Lawrence J. believed that a
moral certainty of profit or loss was sufficient to create an insurable
interest. Madame Justice Wilson stresses that for a time Lawrence's
view was accepted: Patterson v. Harris (1861), 1 B. & S. 336, 121
E.R. 270; Wilson v. Jones (1867), L.R. 2 Ex. 139; Blascheck v.
Bussell (1916), 33 T.L.R. 51 (Eng. K.B.). Lawrence's opinion is
being upgraded.
It was Lord Eldon who favored the narrow view of insurable
interest. Madame Justice Wilson attacks his reasons. Eldon had
argued that a broad definition could lead to a lack of certainty. Mad-
ame Justice Wilson uses scholarly authority to support the very oppo-
site. Eldon also had feared a broad definition might lead to too much
insurance. This fear she regards as illusory. Those who want insur-
ance still have to disclose their interest; if the insurance company is
doubtful it need not write the policy, or it can limit its liability or
charge higher premiums. The insurance companies, not the courts,
should exercise judgment. She also suggests a stronger argument
could be made for the opposite proposition, that there was too little
insurance. "I would have thought that a stronger argument could be
made that there is too little insurance. Why should the porter in Lord
Eldon's example not be able to obtain insurance against the possibility
of being temporarily out of work as a result of the sinking of the ships?
As far as the insurer is concerned, how would this insurance differ
from, say, health insurance covering loss of wages resulting from his
own disability? If anything, the moral hazard would seem to be lower
in the case of a porter's insurance on the possibility of loss resulting
from the sinking of a ship. A broadening of the concept of insurable
interest would, it seems to me, allow for the creation of more socially
beneficial insurance policies than is the case at present with no in-
crease in risk to the insurer." It is instructive that from Eldon's
examples she should select that of the dock porter, and show her
sympathy with his interests.
She accepts that Eldon's line was adopted in Macaura v. Northern
Assurance Co. [1925] A.C. 619, but she rejects Buckmaster's further
argument in that case that it could be difficult to assess the loss of an
individual shareholder. She points out that there are other situations
where assessment is difficult but the courts do it.
She also notes scholarly opinion that the court may have been
influenced in its decision by the (unproven) suggestion of fraud. "In
my view, this inference, if legitimate, further weakens the authority of
Macaura as a precedent." That authority is still being eroded. It is
further eroded by her claim that the Macaura principle was not strictly
followed in later cases.
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Still, the Supreme Court of Canada had adopted Eldon's view of
insurable interest in Clark v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1879), 4
S.C.R. 192. Macaura was also referred in Aqua-Land Exploration,
Ltd.14 and Wandlyn Motels Ltd."5 "In neither case did the Court
examine the case in any detail. It appears to have been accepted
without question." (p. 21). She is still undermining Macaura, using
an argument that might have been used to strengthen it: Macaura, the
other side of the argument could have gone, was so persuasive that its
correctness did not come into question.
I do not find where she says that Macaura was the law of Ontario
but she must accept that it was. The rest of her judgment is a
discussion and dismissal of the three policy arguments adduced in
favor of a restricted view of an insurable interest.
The first of these is a policy against wagering. Madame Justice
Wilson notes that the current definition of insurable interest is not an
ideal instrument to combat this ill: "The insurer alone can raise the
defense of lack of insurable interest; no public watchdog can raise it.
The insurer is free not to invoke the defense in a particular case or it
can invoke it for reasons completely extraneous to and perhaps incon-
sistent with those underlying the definition." (p. 23).
The second argument is a policy favoring limitation of indemnity.
She points out that the Macaura principle does not implement this
policy, but a wider definition would. Mr. Kosmopoulos had, indeed,
suffered financial loss (p. 24).
The third policy argument is that if the insured had no interest in
the subject matter of the insurance he is more likely to destroy it to
obtain the insurance money. She shows that the narrow definition
does not have this effect, and insists that the exclusion from insurance
of interests such as Kosmopoulos "is quite a price to pay for the
supposed disincentive to wilful destruction of the insured property."
(p. 26).
A further argument in favor of abandoning the Macaura principle
is that although it is the law of England, Australia and New Zealand, a
wider approach has been adopted in many U.S. jurisdictions. (pp.
28f).
A marked feature throughout is constant citation of scholarly lit-
erature to support her reasoning. No one case could demonstrate
Madame Justice Wilson's range of expertise, and I would only men-
14. Guarantee Co. of North American v. Aqua-Land Exploration, Ltd., [1966] S.C.R. 133.
15. Wandlyn Motels, Ltd. v. Commerce General Insurance Co., [1970] S.C.R. 992.
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tion that in other cases she has shown a tendency to cite contemporary
writers on legal philosophy, such as Gerald Dworkin. 6
It cannot be to my purpose to compare and contrast Madame
Justice Wilson with her colleagues on the Bench. That would be
invidious in the extreme. But to exemplify her approach I should note
Mr. Justice McIntyre's opinion in the same case. (p. 31). He accepts
the decision. But he would not totally reject the Macaura principle.
That is to say that he would retain the rule but add another exception.
This is the approach that we have seen Madame Justice Wilson ex-
pressly reject.
But what are the characteristics that emerge from an examination
of a judgment of Madame Justice Wilson?
In my view, the first is as I have already stated an empathy with the
humans involved in the case. She has a strong understanding of the
human condition.
A second characteristic is sympathy for the underdog. 17
A third marked characteristic is rhetorical skill in presenting her
arguments, in undermining authority opposed to her. This is combined
with a clarity of exposition that is particularly persuasive.
There is also rationality and logic, that sweep one along to an
acceptance of her conclusions. This is reflected in her willingness to
make new and better law: and in her unwillingness to add another
exception to an unjust rule.
But the most marked characteristic is an intense concern for the
civil society, the humane society. This is what underlies all her policy
arguments and her lack of sympathy with technical objections to
doing justice. 8 This is what causes her to dissent or at least to
disagree on the reasons so often.
When we think of Lord Mansfield, that other superb judge, we
automatically think of commercial law, even though he was influential
in other spheres. When we think of Madame Bertha Wilson, equally
at home in many fields, we think of individuals' rights and liberties.
What do we find when we line up these characteristics with those
of the Scottish Enlightenment and the Democratic Intellect?
16. R. v. Pard [1987] 2 S.C.R. 618 at p. 626.
17. See, e.g., her dissent in RWDSUv. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R., 460 atpp. 485ff; see also
e.g., R. v. Rahey, [1987] I S.C.1L 588 at 618ff.
18. See again her dissent in RWDSU v. Saskatchewan ibid.; her opinion disagreeing with the
reasons in Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 at 531ff; similarly in Argentina v. Mellino,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 536 at pp. 561ff; UnitedStates v.Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564 atpp. 575ff; again,
R. v. Rahey Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R 801; Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.RL
857; Caron v. Caron, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892; R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 892; Re: An Act to
amend the Education Act, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
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Let us consider the Enlightenment first. I would stress above all a
shared concern for the civil society. But in the Enlightenment the
concern above all was, naturally enough, to uncover the roots of civil
society and explain the stages of development. In the wake of this,
Madame Justice Wilson's goal is to expand the practical reality of the
civil society.
Then rhetoric was of considerable interest to leading figures in the
Enlightenment, such as Dugald Steward. No doubt one can argue that
the fee system would persuade professors to make an art of teaching.
But equally it is beyond doubt that the feeling existed that knowledge
and understanding should be presented as attractively and persua-
sively as possible.19
With regard to philosophical doctrines of the Enlightenment, I do
not think I have found anything in Madame Justice Wilson's judg-
ments that could not have been found in the opinions of philosophi-
cally sophisticated judges who had been trained elsewhere but had
some exposure to trends in eighteenth century thought.
Madame Justice Wilson uses law creatively. While lawyers such
as Lords Monboddo and Kames are important Enlightenment think-
ers, their importance does not primarily lie in the field of legal think-
ing. Nor, to turn to perhaps a slightly earlier age should we, in my
view, give the usual praise to Lord Stair. Certainly, he did set forth the
first systematic treatment of Scots law on a new basis in his first
edition of the Institutions of the Law of Scotland, first published in
1681. But that basis was cumbrous, and did not attract any following.
Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that Sir George Mackenzie's book of
the same name, that was published three years later, was a riposte,
revealing his dissatisfaction with Stair's Institutions? It was Mac-
kenzie's approach, following the conventional continental line, that
won approbation in Scottish legal education.2' Of the Scottish En-
lightenment lawyers I would probably single out Lord Kames as a
thinker about law. But Kames' approach with an emphasis on the
requirement of historical knowledge for understanding law is not quite
that of Madame Justice Wilson.2 When she uses history, it is largely
to show that particular circumstances played a role in a judgment, and
19. See, e.g., Chitnis, Supra, note 7, pp. 173ff.
20. A. Watson,, "Some Notes on Mackenzie's Institutions and the European Legal Tradition"
(1989), 16 Ius Commune, pp. 303ff at pp. 310ff.
21. See above all, J. Cairns, "John Millar's Lectures on Scots Criminal Law," (1988), 8 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 364ff at p. 3 8 2.
22. See, e.g., the preface to his Historical Law Traits.
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that in other circumstances the precedent may not be entirely persua-
sive.
Ever since the publication of G.E. Davie's celebrated book, The
Democratic Intellect,23 the nature of the notion in nineteenth century
Scotland has been a matter of debate. But two features should be
uncontroverted: the stress on compulsory classes in philosophy, and
that university education was open to economically poorer strata of
society than was the case in England. The impact of these features on
the Scottish character will continue to be debated. It is reasonable to
believe that they would make many professional people more aware
of the disadvantages of the underprivileged, interested in the common
scene, able to debate more rationally, and be rather down to earth.
With regard to Madame Justice Wilson, one has to observe that the
days of so much compulsory philosophy had gone before she went to
Aberdeen University but, like her two brothers, she concentrated on
philosophy in her M.A. degree. And an English girl of her back-
ground was much less likely to attend university in 1941.
Madame Justice Wilson represents the best of the typical product
of the Scottish Enlightenment and the Democratic Intellect. In so far
as she does, we should be proud not only of her, but also of the
Scottish achievement and contribution. But remembering David Hume
on causation I have my hesitations. I am inclined to suspect that in
addition to her natural character it was those hard years as a minister's
wife in Macduff that gave her her sublime understanding of, and
exceptional sympathy with the human condition.
Working on this paper has broadened my conception of "the good
judge." Elsewhere I wrote:
... judges are unable to give society what it expects from them. The
populace expects from judges the correct legal decision as a result of
their applying the law to the facts. How do good judges arrive at their
decisions? It is easier to say what makes a bad judge: his reasoning is
lacking in logic, or he fails to know or to understand relevant law. But
one cannot say that a good judge, at least in most types of appellate
civil cases, is one who arrives at the correct decision through the use of
logic and the application of the legal rules to established facts. Pro-
vided that the attorneys for the parties have done their work adequately
and prepared their case, there is no answer that is necessarily correct.
The case can go either way. The answer that is correct is the one the
judges come to, but it is correct only after, and only because, they come
to it. ... So, possibly, all judges who are not obviously bad judges ought
23. G.E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect, (Edinburgh, 1961).
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to be counted good judges? Yet insiders all believe that there are, in
addition to bad judges, mediocre and good judges, and that among
good judges some are better than others. What are the criteria for
insiders? The answer I suggest is that for insiders a good judge is one
who reaches the law to be applied to the facts by a mental process that
is thought to be the most appropriate by his brother judges and by well-
placed attorneys and legal scholars. What the appropriate mental
process is will be determined by the legal culture, and, like other
aspects of culture, will scarcely be questioned by those participating in
it.24
On this basis Madame Justice Wilson has all the qualities of the
good judges. She plays the judging game to perfection. But she has
taught me more. A good judge adds to her decisions a full measure of
understanding and compassion.
But I am left with a question that has troubled me since I first
began to work on this talk, and to which I have no answer. Sexism is
by no means dead in Scotland. It is not so many years ago that I was
asked by a Senator of the College of Justice, at an advocate's dinner
party, whether I thought a woman could be capable of drawing up a
contract. But in my experience, the U.S.A. is much more sexist. In
my law school classes at Glasgow in the fifties, female students were
about as numerous as men. But when I first taught a class in the U.S.,
in 1967, out of rather more than one hundred students, one was
female. She was also the only black. And now I believe I recognize a
pattern. Women are accepted as law professors, indeed singled out as
super stars, by male colleagues if they adopt a demure posture. Woe
unto those who achieve a reputation by publishing, who sound a
dissident voice in meetings, wear tight skirts. The male approval of a
woman who fits the male stereotype of her subordinate role masks
their sexism from those who practice it. But now my question. What
on earth did those persons responsible for appointing Bertha Wilson to
the Court of Appeal of Ontario think they were getting when they
chose a Scots woman, married to a Presbyterian minister, a mature
student in law school, a lawyer who never had appeared in court?
They got Madame Justice Bertha Wilson.
24. Watson, Supra, note 8, p. 221.
